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Abstract
In addition to the wireless telephone boom, similar exponential increasing trend in wireless data 
service – short messaging services (SMS) –, is visible, as technology advances. Given these 
interesting communication trends, we develop a structural model to understand mobile users’ 
behavior in the individual level consumption of voice and SMS services, allowing for cross-service 
dependencies. The key issues are the own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticities of these 
services.  The cross-price elasticity is of significant importance because the marketing activities 
are critically influenced by whether the goods are substitutes or complements. The research 
context also poses interesting econometric challenges (One-way and ‘Step’ Nonlinear pricing and 
Discrete (bundle choice)/continuous quantity model). Using a detailed individual level 
consumption data, we estimate that there is small substitution effect between voice service and 
SMS services. We also find that own price elasticity for voice services is relatively small.  Younger 
users are far more inelastic than the older group in four kind of elasticity (own- and cross vs. 
voice and SMS). This is somewhat counter intuitive and gives some unique insight in 
understanding mobile service. 
Key words: Mobile Demand Structure, A Discrete/Continuous Choice Model, Structural Model, Wireless 
Communication 
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Introduction
In most countries throughout the world, mobile (cellular) telephones have grown to be a key part of the 
telecommunication network. Mobile telephones already account for a substantial portion of all telephone 
connections (almost one-third based on reports of OECD, 2001). The growth of wireless telephony networks has
also made possible significant growth in wireless data services, specifically, short messaging services (SMS), which 
has become very popular in European, African, and Eastern Asian countries, changing the way users communicate. 
A recent McKinsey study finds that mobile services have generated billions in consumer welfare. Despite 
tremendous growth in these mobile services, our understanding of how users consume these services is still limited. 
In this context, our paper examines the relationship between the two services and estimates the mobile service 
demand structure reflecting the interdependence (cross effect). The key goal of this paper is to develop a joint model 
of demand for voice and SMS services and then estimate own- and cross-price elasticities of these services.   
This research has important implications for practitioners and academicians. In particular, understanding user 
response to a typical non-linear pricing scheme set by telephone companies is important for managers because it 
allows them to optimally price their products. Understanding of how SMS and voice interact (whether SMS is a 
substitute or complement to voice) will enable managers to predict direct and indirect impact of pricing and 
promoting and make a better decision for the business objectives. Cellular providers have invested billions in data 
services and prevalent belief in the industry is that use of data services also increases consumption of voice (NTT-
DoCoMo). However, the mutual relationship has not been examined in detail in prior literature, presumably due to 
lack of individual level data and relatively recent nature of this phenomenon. Andersson et al. (2006) analyze the 
relationship of two services and the impact of network size on the relationships, but they use highly aggregated level 
dataset. As we will show that individual level data provides more insights and also requires a sophisticated 
analytical framework since the firms routinely offer two-part nonlinear tariffs and a consumer encounter a 
discrete/continuous mixture choice problem for utility maximization. To our knowledge, this is the first study which 
offers a methodology to estimates own price and cross price elasticities for voice and SMS services at individual 
level consumption data. In more specific terms, this paper is composed of two components. The first one is to 
develop a general model describing individual consumption behavior in two mobile services, which explicitly allows 
for mutual dependence of two services. This framework incorporates four crucial elements that could affect user’s 
optimal consumption: (1) substitutive or complementary relationship between two services in terms of utility 
maximization, (2) price response parameters, (3) satiation points, and (4) inherent association between two satiation 
points. These all factors are embedded in the model as parameters of interest to be estimated. The second part is to 
estimate the parameters. We derive the joint likelihood function based on individual utility function specification.
Consumers make sequential choice – they select a plan and then they decide a consumption bundle. However, the 
expected consumption bundle affect plan choice as well as the choice of the consumption bundle itself depends on 
the choice of the plan. Thus this endogeneity has to be explicitly accounted for. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a background on the relevant literature in section 2. Our 
research context (data and pricing scheme) is provided in section 3. Section 4 outlines our model and estimation 
strategy. We present our results in section 5. Section 6 concludes and provides avenues for future work along with 
the limitation.
Relevant literature
Telecommunication demand modeling literature has a rich history (see Taylor (1994) for details). Generally, 
telecommunication pricing and consumption has been an intriguing area of research because both mobile and fixed 
phone services have unique characteristics (high fixed costs, almost zero marginal costs, and network externality) 
which pose interesting econometric challenges. More importantly, telecommunication traditionally has been a highly 
regulated industry and there has been lots of work on the impact of regulatory changes on user consumption and 
social welfare. 
Many studies estimate the price elasticity of demand in various contexts. Taylor and Kridel (1990) makes distinction 
between access and use of telephones and model them while calculating the price elasticity for telephone demand. 
Distinguishing the usagee-based (metered) and flat-rate pricing, some researchers investigate how users choose one 
over the other and also how their demand changes when they choose flat-rate pricing as opposed to usage-based 
plans (Park et al. 1983). Kling and Ploeg (1990) calculates price elasticities given in unique contexts. Miravete 
(2002) models users’ uncertainty of the number of minutes demanded in the next month when choosing a plan today. 
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Other studies examine the impact of extra services such as extended area service (EAS). Kridel (1988) estimates the 
proportion of residential customers who would subscribe to EAS in situations where EAS was not previously 
available. Martins-Filho and Mayo (1993) study the impact of EAS on both local and long distance demand and 
subsequently on social welfare. After wireless telephony became widespread, the main research stream has been to 
examine (1) the demand elasticity of mobile subscription (or penetration) or price mark-ups and costs for cellular 
providers and (2) the degree of competition/substitution between mobile and fixed telephones in various situations 
such as “substitute for long distance fixed phone service” and (3) cross effect of fixed phone service and wireless 
service (Ahn et al. 1999; Danaher et al. 2001; Garbacz et al. 2007; Gruber 2001; Hausman 1999; Miravete et al. 
2004; Rodini et al. 2003; Sung et al. 2002). Recently, Economides et al. (2005) reports that telecommunication 
demand can be shifted as a function of cellular service used by the household as well. Given that SMS service is 
omnipresent, the interaction of voice and SMS services provides an interesting and understudied area. Given SMS 
service is relatively newer phenomenon, interaction of voice and SMS services provides an interesting and attractive 
research avenue.
Our work is closely related to the “multiple category purchasing behavior” line of research in marketing discipline 
(see Seetharaman et al. (2005) for a review of this topic). The recognition of cross-category dependencies implies 
that a consumer’s purchase decisions across categories are not independent. In other words, the consumer’s decision 
of whether and how much to buy in one category depends on the consumer’s corresponding decision in the related 
category (Chiang 1991; Niraj et al. 2005; Song et al. 2004). We now provide some details on our data and outline 
key econometric challenges.
The research context
Data
We collected detailed usage data on voice and data service consumption (6847 customers from a large cellular 
service provider for over 9 months beginning April 2002 through December 2002). The firm is the 3rd largest firm 
having a customer base of more than 2 million consumers, in one of the Asian countries. The firm offers two kinds 
of communication services both wireless voice and wireless SMS services.1 We have the information regarding 
wireless service consumptions on the individual level: (1) voice service usage measured in minutes for each month 
and (2) the number of SMSs sent for each month and (3) demographic information about the users (gender, age), in 
the data set. We also have detailed information on the plans offered (see table 1). The categories and pricing scheme 
did not change during our research period. The Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics across age, gender and 
plan choice.
Plan # Fixed (entering)fee (baht) Free minutes
Overtime charge
of voice service (baht)
Charge
of SMS service (baht)
1 350 350
2 800 517
3 1100 917
4 1500 1217
5 2000 2117
3/min 3/message sent
Table 1. Pricing Scheme (one-side and ‘step’ nonlinear pricing)
Whole Sample
Mean S.D. Min Max N
Voice (Minute) 281.3 252.6 10.1 11845.3
SMS (Message) 11.8 34.2 0 3106 59866
Age <30
Voice (Minute) 329.8 299.5 10.2 11845.3
SMS (Message) 16.7 36.7 0 1558 22483
30<=Age <40
Voice (Minute) 265.0965 223.455 10.08 6602.36
SMS (Message) 9.232893 33.69502          0 3106 29520
1 The firm provided WAP service as well. But, we do not use that information in this paper.
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Age>=40
Voice (Minute) 203.6786 168.1059 10.05 2916.9
SMS (Message) 7.315656 26.84394 0 1079 7863
Female
Voice (Minute) 287.1297 257.9581 10.08 11845.31
SMS (Message) 13.19011 31.63919 0 1558 32592
Male
Voice (Minute) 274.3871 246.0002 10.05 6602.36
SMS (Message) 10.14611 37.10299 0 3106 27274
Plan 1
Voice (Minute) 248.9897 167.7135 10.05 2887.17
SMS (Message) 10.17615 31.56993 0 3106 56634
Plan 2
Voice (Minute) 642.5653 316.8856 19.62 4612.55
SMS (Message) 39.08512 59.03361 0 932 2103
Plan 3
Voice (Minute) 1011.397 505.8127 53.23 5169.68
SMS (Message) 44.27733 60.24948 0 633 750
Plan 4
Voice (Minute) 1556.421 994.3582 168.72 11845.31
SMS (Message) 43.13287 54.75447 0 562 286
Plan 5
Voice (Minute) 1994.418 889.3416 429.6 4334.71
SMS (Message) 27.53763 41.02427 0 188 93
Table 2: Average usage statistics
One-side and “step” nonlinear pricing
The research context shows unique pricing scheme: (1) two-part tariff in voice service (zero marginal price until the 
fixed quota and positive marginal price after the quota is exceeded), which is popular in mobile telecommunication, 
and (2) the usage-based pricing in SMS with constant marginal cost, leading to one-side step (discrete) nonlinear 
pricing scheme. First, this pricing is “one-side” nonlinear pricing because the pricing of only the voice service (q) is 
nonlinear – that is, a quantity discount is available in only the voice service. The pricing strategy of voice service is 
the second-degree price discrimination, where every consumer faces the same price schedule, but the schedule 
involves different (average) price depending on the amounts of the voice service consumed. Second, the ratio of 
quantity discount is not linearly related to quantity. When consumers use the voice service under free minutes with 
fixed fee, the (average) unit price depends on the plan selected before consumers start using the service. This is the 
way non-linear pricing is realized by consumers. While the quantity of voice service is continuous, the quantity 
discount is not continuous but discrete. Here we will call it “step or discrete” nonlinear pricing. This one side step 
nonlinear pricing scheme affects consumer utility maximization by generating the shape of the unique budget 
constraint as shown in Figure 1.
The users make two sequential decisions. In stage one, they choose a plan and in stage two, they consume number of 
voice and SMS minutes. Clearly the choice of the plan is endogenous to expected future consumption. Because of 
the two part pricing scheme for voice minutes, the budget line is kinked. The budget constraint is an extension of 
kinked budget constraint analyzed by Moffitt (1990) because users can have different types of kinked budget 
constraint according to the plan choice at the first stage (we will sequence of choice in the next section in detail).
Under the same budget, every plan is characterized by distinctive areas indicating available amounts in voice and 
SMS dimensions and so the plan choice decision at the first stage can be modeled as discrete bundle choice analyzed 
by Chung and Rao (2003). It should be noted that the plan choice shows the relationship between two services as 
well as inference about preference to each service conditional on budget. Figure 2 illustrate the feasible consumption 
bundles (areas) depending on the voice plan choice, and different utility functions in two dimensions (Voice and 
SMS). Suppose that a consumer has the amount of money 2000 –fixed entry fee for plan 5 – assigned to mobile 
communication. If the consumer select plan 5 subject to the budget constraint, he/she cannot use any SMS service
and instead use maximum 2117 minutes of voice service. The maximum of available amount of voice service from 
the other plans is around 1384 (1217+500/3) from plan 4.  The comparison of plan 5 and plan 4 correspond to the 
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feasible area decision between “more than 1384 minutes of voice consumption and no SMS consumption” and “less
than 1384 minutes of voice consumption and maximum of 167 SMS service.” Consumers will search for optimal 
plan choice by iterating the comparison among 5 alternatives. Overlapping the available bundles and the shape of 
utility function, we can see the optimal voice plan choice vary according to the shape of utility function (actually the 
location of optimal bundle giving highest utility).2 That is, there is no general dominant plan as shown Figure 2. In 
our model, the utility function is quasi-linear in cost so that the equation does not depend on income. The 
assumption is reasonable since a relatively small portion of income is assigned to cell services (Economides et al. 
2005). Assuming that consumers have money enough to select any voice plan in a particular month, the plan choice 
is contingent on the shape of utility function. This unique pricing scheme will be related to identification issues later.
Figure 1. Illustration of budget constraints induced from diverse pricing schemes
Figure 2. Feasible area conditional on voice plan and optimal plan choice mechanism
2 We will use the concept of satiation points to handle this issue in the next section.
Voice
SMS
Unique feasible area of plan 4
Unique feasible area of plan 5
Plan 1 is the optimal plan choice conditional on the 
shape of utility function
Plan 3 is the optimal plan choice conditional on the 
shape of utility function
Voice
SMS
Linear Budget Constraint
General nonlinear budget constraint
(Both side and continuous quantity discount)
Nonlinear budget constraint in two mobile services
(One way and step nonlinear pricing)
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Econometric Model
Conceptual background
For the case of many goods, the change in the price of any good induces income and substitution effects that may 
change the quantity of other goods demanded from the Slutsky equation. Then two goods are substitute if one good 
may, as a result of changed conditions, replace the other in use. On the other hand, complements are goods that go 
together. That is, the substitute and complementary relationships can be defined by referring to observed price 
reactions as 0> ji PX and 0< ji PX , respectively. Reflecting on this notion in this study, we will rely on the 
modified concept: 0> ji XX and 0< ji XX , where i and j indicate voice and SMS service, respectively.
We need to exclude the noise affecting cross-effect between two services in terms of consumption level. Manchanda 
et al. (1999) suggest three reasons why multiple categories can be bought together on one shopping: (1) 
complementarity (or cross effect), (2) consumer heterogeneity, and (3) co-incidence. Since the main concern is to 
examine a cross effect, we need to control for the other two sources, namely (2) and (3). First, we need to account 
for user heterogeneity in the intrinsic preferences for two mobile services, respectively. To account for the inherent 
preference, we allow customer type to follow a probability distribution (to be discussed later) for stochastic 
specification. Furthermore, we also incorporate user demographics to account for observed heterogeneity in user 
types. The co-incidence is defined as all reasons except cross effect that could induce joint purchase (consumption in 
our study) across categories (two services in our study). For example, consumers may shop for many items on the 
same shopping trip because of habit or economic reason such as spreading the cost of a trip over many items. In our 
context, while economic reason is not viable, habit can be critical factor over- or under-estimating the cross effect. 
As a result, it is crucial to distinguish the inherent association of two services and the cross effect. For example, it is 
possible that heavy voice service consumers are also likely to use SMS service regardless of cross effect. The 
inherent association is formulated by allowing correlation between consumer preferences for the services.
Analytical framework
Our analytical model is based on (discrete) plan choice and (continuous) consumed quantities across two services 
under the given pricing scheme. Consumers are assumed to maximize utility by making two decisions at the 
different points on the time horizon. A consumer makes a plan choice decision among discrete alternatives in the 
first stage. This choice is based on the expected optimal consumption bundle reflecting the cross effect. The 
consumer decides a vector with two continuous quantities of service usage in the second stage. As a result, the 
analytic framework takes the form of (two stage) discrete/continuous choice model.
In our context, it is obvious that two decisions are statistically dependent. That is, the second decision (consumed
quantities) is made conditional on the first decision and vice versa. This violates the basic assumption of two-step 
approach (limited information MLE). So we have to estimate the model with full information MLE, by deriving 
joint likelihood function. Here, we attempt to derive the joint likelihood function for the observed consumption data 
from general distributional assumptions regarding individual heterogeneity and random error term. This approach 
results in a likelihood specification that facilitates the analysis of mobile demand structure, estimating parameters of 
interest in a mixed discrete/continuous model.
User utility specification
We consider individuals indexed by i=1,2,…,N. The individuals choose a voice plan from the set of available plans, 
indexed by k=1,2,…,5 and then choose continuous quantities (qikt, sikt), conditional on the plan choice. When a user 
selects plan k, the user must pay a fixed fee Tk to sign up for the plan and is allowed to use free minutes of voice 
service FQk. Once the user exceeds the given free minutes, s/he has to incur the marginal cost, pq per unit. Thus,
each plan can be characterized by Tk and FQk. We assume that consumers spend the remainder of their income on an 
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outside good, yi at price 1.3 We assume that the utility individual i obtains from consumption of two services on plan 
k, at the month t, is quadratic.
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Here, bq and bs represent price response parameters, respectively, which will be used for calculating own- and cross-
price elasticity. The point (iq, is) represents a user’s type and it varies across users depending on the individual’s 
inherent preference for two services. Bigger (iq, is) represents higher preference in the service. (iq, is) is closely 
related to the concept of consumer satiation point.4 Satiation point is the maximum level of consumption desired for 
these services. Consumer would not demand more than the satiation point even if the price were zero. Thus at the 
satiation point, two services consumed yield the highest utility possible. Such a quadratic utility structure reflecting
the concept of satiation is frequently modeled in telecommunication demand literature (e.g., Economides et al. 2005; 
Miravette et al 2004). In equation (1), the first term represent the utility obtained from the voice consumption, the 
second term the utility obtained from SMS service, and fourth term utility obtained from the outside good.
As is commonly done, we assume that the utility from outside goods and the utility from the mobile service are 
separable5 – the consumption in mobile services does not affect the marginal utility obtained from outside good and 
vice-versa –, whereas the utility obtained from voice service and one from SMS service are inseparable because the 
increment of consumption in one service can influence on consumer surplus by being weighted by both the 
consumption of the other service and bint (cross effect parameter) – this mechanism is modeled through the third 
term in the equation (1) – in addition to the first (or second) term. That is, this implies that the demands for voice 
and SMS are dependent of each other.
Equation (1) is built on assumption that cross effect is symmetric6 and the homothetic utility structure. Given the 
utility function, the utility from each service usage corresponds to diminishing marginal utility and the negative 
impact of difference between satiation point and real consumption points on consumer surplus depends on only the 
absolute value of the gap.
Consumers first choose an optimal plan and then consume voice and SMS sequentially. However, clearly both 
decisions are endogenous. We solve this problem with backward induction, starting from the second stage, where 
individual selects the optimal quantities for voice and SMS, conditional on the choice of a plan k in the first stage, 
subject to the budget constraint (Ii indicates consumer i’s budget):
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The first order condition is: 
3 The price of the outside good is normalized to one.
4 If there is no cross effect, (iq, is) is a satiation point.
5 Some utility from outside goods (e.g., fixed phone service and broadband services) might be dependent on that from wireless
services. But, one justifies the assumption based on (1) the portion of utility from fixed phone service and broadband services is  
very small (or negligible) as compared to the utility from all other human activity and (2) there are no reports of a consistent 
relationship between them.
6 Given our utility function, this symmetry can be shown by Young’s theorem: U/qiksik is constant as bint.
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The comparison of the consumption bundles leading highest utility – (qikt, sikt)* – from equation 4 between when 
there is no cross effect of two services (bint = 0) and when there is cross effect (bint  0), enable us to see the impact 
of interaction term capturing the cross effect.7 Given the definition and utility specification, the cross effect must be 
symmetric, whatever its direction is. Because bq, bs, qikt, and sikt are positive, the direction of the change depends on 
only the sign of bint (positive or negative). The sign of bint allow us to identify whether the cross effect is 
complementary or substitution between two services.
Demand function
Suppose that a user select plan k (recall that we are analyzing the decision of the second stage, where the optimal 
quantities are determined conditional on k plan choice). And so we can derive two kinds of demand functions in user 
group selecting plan k: demand function 1 (DF1) and demand function 2 (DF2) in equation (5), by simultaneously 
solving the above first order conditions. But, there are practically three kinds of demand functions due to two part
tariff pricing scheme applied to only the voice service.
The three kinds of functions are split by indifference curves, (FQCk, GECk, and IDCmin_k)8, which are derived from 
generated utility based on indirect utility function, )(* •U  (to be discussed in detail later).9
(1) Demand Function 1, (DF1), 
The customers with a relatively lower value composition: (iq, is) = <IDCmin_k, FQCk>10, can reach their optimal
consumption level without additional cost in voice service. 
(2) Demand Function 1 (DF2)
Demand function 2 and 3 occur when the voice consumption giving maximum utility is higher than the free minutes
under the selected plan: *iktq > FQk (or equivalently (iq, is) = <FQCk, IDCmin_k+1>). The users located at the area
keep consuming up to the free minute. And they reach kinked point, they will compare the marginal utility from one 
more minute of voice service and the marginal cost. When the marginal utility is lower than the marginal cost, they 
stop the consumption of voice service without incurring additional cost in voice service. This users’ consumption 
behavior corresponds to the demand function 2. As a result, their optimal consumption is less than an ideal optimal 
consumption ( *iktq = FQk) in voice service. The user type showing this behavior involves in <FQCk, GECk>. 
(3) Demand Function 3 (DF3)
If (iq, is) = <GECk, IDCmin_k+1>, the user consumes optimally by incurring marginal cost because the marginal 
utility at the free minute (kinked point) is greater than marginal cost. Ultimately, the user keeps consuming more 
voice until the marginal utility is same as the marginal costs. It should be noted that optimal consumptions in two 
7 Because the consumption bundle giving maximum utility can or cannot be reached depending on individual heterogeneous 
satiation points and the given price scheme, we don’t call it optimal consumption now. We will derive “real” optimal 
consumption bundle from the demand function in the next section. Here, all consumption must be positive.
8 They are all indifference curves in a user group selecting a certain plan and the abbreviations of Free Quote Curve, Great 
Eater Curve, and InDifference Curve.
9 Since the actual consumption is to some extent out of the consumer's control (in terms of bounded rationality), the expected 
optimal consumption is determined under uncertainty. But the uncertainty will not change our model once the impact of the 
uncertainty is zero mean.
10 This notation indicates the point is between two curves (lines).
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services are determined simultaneously and that in both DF2 and DF3, the optimal consumptions in both services 
would be less than ideal optimal consumption (satiation point) because satiation point does not reflects marginal cost 
and thus marginal cost prohibits users from consuming up to a satiation point.
We divided the all users belonging to < IDCmin_k, IDCmin_k+1> into three sub-groups and the users of such each group
have same demand function. We will derive indifference curves, (FQCk, GECk, and IDCmin_k), in the next section.
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User heterogeneity and indifference curves
We showed that each individual’s demand function is determined by user type, (iq, is). All users belonging to <
IDCmin_k, IDCmin_k+1>, which indicates the specific area in two dimensions of (iq, is), select the plan k  as the best 
choice for utility maximization. We can derive an indirect utility function, plugging ),( ** iktikt sq  from equation (5) 
into the utility specification in equation (3) (not shown due to space considerations). Equation (5) shows different 
demand functions in a group selecting plan k. As a result, we can classify users into 5 different plan choices . It can 
be verifies that (i) the ranking of the plans is monotone in iq; (ii) the ranking of the plans is monotone in is as well; 
(iii) The shape of indifference curves (here, the slope of indifference lines) is identical across plans under the 
assumption that the utility function is homothetic. 
Comparing the indirect utility functions across five plans, we can calculate indifference curves which separate two 
adjoining plans.  
The indifference curves are given by
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We can see that the indifference curve is affected by three sources:(1) (iq, is), (2) (Tk, FQk, pq, and ps), and (3) (bq,
bs, and bint ). All indifference curves has same slope, -1/(bqbint). The interpretation of the slope is identical to the 
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interpretation of bint – positive value of bint indicates substitute and otherwise complement –. Since (Tk, FQk, pq, and 
ps) is exogenously given factors, indifference curves consist of (iq, is) and (bq, bs, and bint ) so that is is a function 
of (iq, bq, bs, bint) conditional on k. We classified (iq, is) based on the observed plan choice and acquired 
indifference curves, (IDCmin_k). FQCk and GECk can be derived in the similar way IDCmin_k is derived.
Estimation procedure
To operationalize the theoretical model, we derive a joint likelihood function. We, first, formulate the probability of 
choosing a plan k and then the probability of observing real consumption bundle (qikt, sikt) conditional on the plan 
choice. 
The probability of choosing a plan k
We calculate the probability of individual i ’s choosing a plan k, from the fact that the user chooses the plan that 
maximized utility, conditional on the expected future consumptions (not real consumption) derived from (iq, is) 
and (bq, bs and bint). Here we assume that the consumer knows its individual type (iq, is) though it is not observed 
by the econometrician. We assume that (iq, is) follows a truncated bivariate normal distribution. 
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Since satiation point can never be less than zero, the truncated distribution is appropriate. We allow correlation 
between iq and is to capture the inherent association of two services. Thus, if  > 0, it indicates that the preference 
for voice service is positively correlated to the preference for SMS service. The distinction between the relationship 
of iq and is and the relationship of real consumptions in the two services is extremely important in our research 
concern. The parameters (bq, bs bint and mean, variance and correlation) are the structural parameters of interest to be 
estimated. Given the distributional assumption, we can write the probability of a consumer choosing plan:
 ===
kD isiqisiqisiqik
ddfk  ),(),|planPr(Pr , where 1min_min_ , += kkk IDCIDCD (7) 
The probability of observing (qikt, sikt) conditional on k
In the second stage, consumers select a consumption bundle of voice and SMS. However, actual demand observed is 
not same as the expected demand derived from equation (5). The difference between “real” consumption and 
“calculated or expected” consumption levels occur due to unobserved noise that consumers cannot anticipate. Thus
the error term reflects the random shock (or measurement error) the user may experience in the given month. For 
empirical estimation, we add error term in demand function as additive form following Burtless and Hausman’s
(1978) approach. Here, we assume that the distribution of error terms, ( )siktqiktu  ,  follows bivariate normal and also 
the two random terms are independent. Assuming f(iq, is) and ( )siktqiktu  ,  are stochastically independent, the 
probability of observing the usage, ),( iktikt sq conditional on plan k is:
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Now we can derive the joint distribution of a user i choosing the plan and then choosing (qikt, sikt) given individual 
(iq, is). The joint likelihood function for a user is ),|&()|(Pr ksqgk iktiktikik •×• . We maximize the next 
function:
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!=×!=
kD isiqisiq
s
iktq
q
iktq
i
ikik
i
ddfuugL  ),((...)(...)Pr (10) 
Kim et al. / Empirical Analysis of Mobile Voice and SMS services
Twenty Eighth International Conference on Information Systems, Montreal 2007 11
Log likelihood is:
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ×$
i
s
iktq
q
iktqf uuTrEL isiq  ),(lnln (11) 
We cannot obtain closed form expressions for the joint likelihood function and we have to compute the integrals 
numerically. We estimated the model with two ways: (1) maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with direct 
numerical approximation and (2) maximum simulated likelihood estimation (MSLE) using Monte Carlo methods. 
When we rely on MLE, we could estimate the model with samples randomly selected (150 observations) from our 
full dataset to overcome the huge computational challenges involved in estimation. The results from the quadrature 
integration are similar to simulation-based estimation. Here, we are focused on the analysis results from the second 
way, which can employ relatively big sample size (1000) more efficiently. We used the BHHH (outer product of 
gradients) estimator to compute the asymptotic covariance matrix of the simulated maximum likelihood estimator, 
based on simulation based estimation as well.
Identification issues
As the three choice decisions, [(k), (qikt, sikt)] are the consequences of a single utility maximization for an individual, 
the model ensures that these decisions provide, in combination, the greatest possible utility to the individual. We 
have unobserved heterogeneity across individuals in the derivation of the joint probability. Each individual is 
expected to have a fixed value affecting the optimal consumption bundle, indirectly showing intrinsic service 
preferences. Thus different individuals choose a different plan choice and a different consumption bundle. The 
parameters in our model are, in general, identified by systematic variation in plan choice and consumptions given 
plan choice across individuals. Parameters relating to distributional assumptions can be identified through the 
maximization of joint likelihood conditional on a plan choice. The key parameters (bq, bs and bint) can be estimated 
through not only likelihood maximization but also the variation of plan choice – the unique pricing scheme causing 
kinked budget constraint allows us to identify them.
Result and Discussion
The estimation results are given in Table 3. We first estimate our model without incorporating demographics (see 
the first column of Table 3. One of our key interests is the sign of bint. The negative and significant bint provides the 
evidence that voice and SMS are substitutive relationship. That is, the optimal consumption level in voice (or SMS) 
decreases as the consumption of other service goes up. 
The intrinsic association between satiation points in two services is highly significantly positively related ( = 
0.9008). That is, this shows that heavy users of one service are likely to be heavy user in the other service regardless 
of substitution or complementary effect. Compared to the correlation of two services in terms of real consumptions 
of voice and SMS (around 0.2), the estimated  is very high. Given that, we can infer that if one does not reflect on 
the impact of the intrinsic association of two services, one would get the biased result of the relationship between 
real consumptions in the two services (cross effect). 
We next split the data into demographic factor (age and gender) and analyze difference of the key parameters across 
sub-groups. The result of estimation is shown from column 2 to column 6. We observe some variation of estimated 
parameters across either age or gender. We tested the differences statistically and the result is shown in column 7-8. 
There are several factors showing significant difference across groups. 
Younger users, on average, have higher (iq, is) – user type – in both services.  The correlation of (iq, is) in 
younger user group is less than that in the older group and also we found stronger substitution effect in younger
group than the older group. Two price response parameters are both significant in all groups except G3. Since bq is 
significantly greater than bs, we can see the voice consumption is more sensitive to price change. Analyzing the 
impact of gender, there is not significant difference of µq and µs by gender. There is some significant difference in bq. 
We will discuss the implication of the two price response parameters in details with own- and cross-price elasticity 
calculated.
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All G1Age<30
G2
Age=[30,40]
G3
Age>=40
S0
Female (0)
S1
Male (1) G1-G2 S0-S1
bint -0.317*(0.180)
-0.56*
(0.28)
-0.40***
(0.12)
-0.36
(0.59)
-0.50
(0.30)
-0.28***
(0.11) X X
bq 7.4***(1.9492)
5.49***
(2.16)
7.12***
(2.37)
8.83
(6.40)
9.15**
(4.11)
8.30***
(2.71) X O
 bs 0.12(0.08)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.14***
(0.05)
0.1088
(0.2070)
0.07^
(0.04)
0.20***
(0.08) X X
µq
347.16***
(4.30)
393.57***
(7.23)
289.80***
(5.80)
240.55***
(14.37)
307.52***
(8.01)
289.67***
(8.90) O X
µs
18.20***
(1.18)
24.00***
(1.01)
20.96***
(1.20)
10.75***
(3.64)
17.37***
(0.49)
19.38***
(1.21) O X
q 156.56***(5.32)
146.86***
(7.09)
138.80***
(3.56)
137.31***
(11.71)
135.66***
(4.33)
125.48***
(3.75) X O
s 11.21***(0.53)
16.49***
(0.27)
11.67***
(0.52)
6.8536***
(1.7303)
10.01***
(0.27)
10.00***
(0.73) O X
q 162.58***(1.13)
154.29***
(0.96) 
162.76***
(1.15)
166.20***
(2.64)
194.95***
(1.50)
164.26***
(1.55) O O
s 6.34***(0.003)
9.02***
(0.02)
5.92***
(0.008)
5.13***
(0.005)
7.69***
(0.0088)
6.07***
(0.01) O O
 0.90***(0.005)
0.80***
(0.02)
0.93***
(0.005)
0.97***
(0.009)
0.74***
(0.01)
0.98***
(0.007) O O
N 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Log-
likelihood -9126.0 -9842.9 -9154.5 -9146.7 -9653.0 -9034.7
*Significant at p< 0.1   **Significant at p< 0.05   ***Significant at p< 0.01 in two tailed test
^Significant at p< 0.1  in one tailed test
Table 3. Estimated parameters (Standard errors are shown in parentheses)
Estimated own- and cross-price elasticities
We calculate the own- and cross-price elasticites based on the DF3 in equation (5) – the marginal price of voice is 
not included in both demand function (1) and (2) – , using invariance characteristics of MLE. These appear in Table 
4, where we calculate the elasticities at the mean values in both services and at the marginal price information – e.g., 
)1(3 2intint qssqq bbbqbbb = . The reaction to proportional price changes will be quite different depending on 
whether prices are high or low (or equivalently the elasticity depends on consumed quantity in a linear demand 
function). Given the substitution effect (bint < 0), the own-price elasticities are negative and the cross elasticities are 
positive. Several interesting results emerge from this Table 4.
Mean-usage price elasticity
Whole Sample
Mean Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Voice 285 -0.08257 0.06892
SMS 13 -0.03045 0.00314
G1: Age <30
Mean Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Voice 330 -0.05614 0.03910
SMS 17 -0.01270 0.00201
G2: 30<=Age <40
Mean Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Voice 265 -0.09732 0.15389
SMS 10 -0.05361 0.00581
G3: Age>=40
Mean Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Voice 204 -0.14891 0.15013
SMS 8 -0.04674 0.00589
S0: Female
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Mean Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Voice 287 -0.11586 0.08968
SMS 14 -0.01950 0.00437
S1: Male
Mean Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
Voice 274 -0.10521 0.16686
SMS 10 -0.07104 0.00609
Table 4. Estimated own- and cross-price elasticities
(1) Comparison to fixed line
Estimates for own price elasticities are small compared to what has been reported in fixed line telecommunication 
research. According to Kling and Ploeg (1990) and Park et al. (1983), price elasticity in fixed phone service report is
in the range of -0.1. Our estimates show that users are less sensitive to price in mobile voice service than fix phone 
voice service. A possible explanation is that mobile communication play a role of indispensable communication tool
and the value of wireless communication service is perceived as if it is necessities of life.
(2) Comparison between voice and SMS in terms of own and cross elasiticities
SMS service is far less elastic than voice service in own price elasticity by about 3 times.  One explanation is that 
the specific value of SMS service exists and the users perceives SMS service as invaluable communication tool. But 
it is quite possible that this result comes from relatively small consumption because the price elasticity is calculated 
with not only price response parameters but also average usage.
We found that there is an asymmetric pattern in cross-price elasticities. 11 Price changes of SMS service have a 
larger effect on voice service than the other way. In particular, cross-price elasticity of SMS demand is extremely 
low (0.068 vs. 0.003 by about 20 times).12 We can infer based on this finding that users perceived Voice service as 
key (primary) communication tool even if there is substitute effect.
(3) Comparison based on demographics
The result shows that the price elasticities are different both across groups segmented by age as well as across male 
group and female gender. First, we find that the younger users are inelastic than the older group in four kind of 
elasticity (own- and cross vs. voice and SMS) on the basis of comparison of G1 and G2. We do not have information 
regarding individual income. But, it is generally believed that the older users have higher income and they are 
expected to be more inelastic to price change. In a sense, this is somewhat counter intuitive. Second, the cross-price 
elasticity of voice demand in group 1 is far lower than those in other groups (0.039 vs. 0.153). Therefore, we 
conclude that when marginal cost of SMS increase, the older are more likely to change the communication tool from 
SMS to voice than the younger are. Third, the female users are inelastic than the male users in SMS service while 
there are not big difference in voice elasticity. And the cross-price elasticity of voice demand in female group is far 
lower than those in male groups (0.089 vs. 0.16). We can infer that when marginal cost of SMS increase, the men
are more likely to change the communication tool from SMS to voice than the women are.
With the structural parameters in hand, the managers can now perform what-if analysis. We do not show it here due 
to space limitations but we can now ask the questions: What happens to firm’s demand and hence profits if the fixed 
price of plan1 is changed? Or marginal price of voice minutes in plan 2 is changed. Thus, our model provides 
actionable recommendation to the managers. 
Conclusion, limitation and further research direction
We provide a very general methodology to construct an estimable structure which takes into account the sequential 
nature of consumer decision making, non linear pricing commonly observed in cellular markets and consumption of 
two distinct services. We estimate the model with a unique and rich individual level data. In particular, we estimated 
“real” substitutive impact by controlling inherent association between two services with conceptual framework of 
user types (satiation point).
11 Here, “asymmetric pattern” indicates that the magnitude is not identical. The directions are same.
12 There could be scaling problem in the interpretation
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Our results show that voice and SMS services are substitutive each other. We also find that price elasticity in mobile 
service (-0.08 for voice and -0.03 for SMS) is a little less than what has been observed in landline phones where 
many researchers have reported elasticities in the range of -0.1 to -0.2. We estimate that 100% increase in the 
marginal price of SMS increases voice consumption in the tune of about 6.8%. We also explore how demographic 
characteristics change user sensitivity. We find that older users are more price sensitive and that there is little 
difference between the consumption patterns of males and females. The extent of substitution effect and price 
elasticity somewhat depends on users’ demographic factors. The distinction of the inherent association and the price 
elasticities could be informative for practical managerial implication such as optimal pricing scheme.
We assume that satiation points of two services are interdependent through a truncated bivariate normal structure. 
However, we cannot answer how two services are interrelated, or on which dimension they are interdependent. 
Furthermore, future study can decompose users' heterogeneity based on other observables. Such specification may 
result in a more powerful model that better incorporates users' heterogeneity, as well as extending its predictive 
power to forecast substitutive and complementary relationships among services. In a similar vein, users’ utility 
maximization critically depends on satiation points as well as other parameters in our model. Although we find there 
is some variation across segmented groups, we cannot explain how the satiation points are established. This could be 
very interesting topic for future research.
We cannot observe the budget allocated to mobile service as well as (disposable) income. Therefore, our analytical 
framework doesn’t reflect on how individual users allocate her monthly budget in mobile communication and 
outside goods. Our current work is focused on Voice and SMS in mobile service. Future work should analyze other 
service such as WAP (Wireless Application Protocol). Actually, nowadays, subscribers of mobile service can access 
WAP service. WAP is typically used for diverse ways, accessing email, stock quote or any other information. So, it 
leaves us another interesting empirical question, “Does WAP substitute voice service as well?”
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